LinkedIn password database compromised

Leo Bicknell bicknell at ufp.org
Wed Jun 20 19:43:44 UTC 2012


In a message written on Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 03:30:58PM -0400, AP NANOG wrote:
> So the question falls back on how can we make things better?

Dump passwords.

The tech community went through this back in oh, 1990-1993 when
folks were sniffing passwords with tcpdump and sysadmins were using
Telnet.  SSH was developed, and the problem was effectively solved.

If you want to give me access to your box, I send you my public
key.  In the clear.  It doesn't matter if the hacker has it or not.
When I want to log in I authenticate with my private key, and I'm
in.

The leaks stop immediately.  There's almost no value in a database of
public keys, heck if you want one go download a PGP keyring now.  I can
use the same "password" (key) for every web site on the planet, web
sites no longer need to enforce dumb rules (one letter, one number, one
character your fingers can't type easily, minimum 273 characters).

SSL certificates could be used this way today.

SSH keys could be used this way today.

PGP keys could be used this way today.

What's missing?  A pretty UI for the users.  Apple, Mozilla, W3C,
Microsoft IE developers and so on need to get their butts in gear
and make a pretty UI to create personal key material, send the
public key as part of a sign up form, import a key, and so on.

There is no way to make passwords "secure".  We've spent 20 years
trying, simply to fail in more spectacular ways each time.  Death to
traditional passwords, they have no place in a modern world.

-- 
       Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440
        PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 826 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/attachments/20120620/6e92f40b/attachment.sig>


More information about the NANOG mailing list