Why not to use RPKI (Was Re: Argus: a hijacking alarm system)

Fri Jan 20 12:38:55 UTC 2012

RPKI is great.

But, firstly, ROA doesn't cover all the prefixes now,
we need an alternative service to alert hijackings.

secondly, ROA can only secure the 'Origin AS' of a prefix,
while Argus can discover potential hijackings caused by anomalous AS path.

After ROA and BGPsec deployed in the entire Internet (or, in all of your
network),
Argus will stop the service :)

2012/1/20 Arturo Servin <aservin at lacnic.net>

>
>        You could use RPKI and origin validation as well.
>
>        We have an application that does that.
>
>        http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/
>
>        For example you can periodically check if your prefix is valid:
>
>
> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/valid/cidr/200.7.84.0/23/
>
>        If it were invalid for a possible hijack it would look like:
>
>
> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/invalid/cidr/200.31.18.0/24/
>
>        Or you can just query for any state:
>
>
> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/all/cidr/200.31.12.0/22/
>
>
>
> Regards,
> as
>
>
>

-- 
_________________________________________
Yang Xiang. Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University
Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn