Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389

Erik Soosalu erik.soosalu at calyxinc.com
Fri Jan 13 07:38:19 CST 2012


I would agree that it is a large stream.

The other thing would be a password crack attempt.  There was tool out a couple of years, and I've forgotten the name of it now, that worked at brute forcing RDP passwords.  It worked without ending up in the Windows logs, because at the time Windows would only log incorrect RDP password attempts on the 5th try.  So it would try 4 passwords, disconnect and then connect again.

If it was such a program, trying as fast as it could, there would be a lot of initial "screen renders" being sent to the attack IP with very little traffic coming back - just the login attempts.

Thanks,
Erik 


-----Original Message-----
From: James Braunegg [mailto:james.braunegg at micron21.com] 
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 8:29 AM
To: Erik Soosalu; nanog at nanog.org
Subject: RE: Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389

Dear Erik

2mbits to 4mbits of outbound traffic is a fair bit for just a port scan.. 

We saw around 100ks of inbound traffic to each server and around 2mbits to 4mbits outbound traffic from the servers to the same destination 58.162.67.45       

The traffic pattern occurred for around 30 minutes and then simultaneously every host (server) stopped sending traffic.

Kindest Regards

James Braunegg
W:  1300 769 972  |  M:  0488 997 207 |  D:  (03) 9751 7616
E:   james.braunegg at micron21.com  |  ABN:  12 109 977 666   



This message is intended for the addressee named above. It may contain privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this message you must not use, copy, distribute or disclose it to anyone other than the addressee. If you have received this message in error please return the message to the sender by replying to it and then delete the message from your computer.


-----Original Message-----
From: Erik Soosalu [mailto:erik.soosalu at calyxinc.com] 
Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2012 12:17 AM
To: James Braunegg; nanog at nanog.org
Subject: RE: Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389

Wouldn't this just be an indication of that block being scanned for open
3389 ports from that IP?  You're just looking at the return traffic to the scanning host.


-----Original Message-----
From: James Braunegg [mailto:james.braunegg at micron21.com]
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 7:37 AM
To: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389

Hey All,

Just posting to see if anyone has seen any strange outbound traffic on port 3389 from Microsoft Windows Server over the last few hours.

We witnessed an alarming amount of completely independent Microsoft Windows Servers,  each on separate vlan and subnets (ie all /30 and /29
allocations) with separate gateways on and completely separate customers, but all services were within the same 1.x.x.x/16 allocation all simultaneously send around 2mbit or so data to a specific target IP address.

The only common link was / is terminal services port 3389 is open to the public. Obviously someone (Mr 133t dude) scanned an allocation within our network, and like a worm was able to simultaneously control every Microsoft Windows Server to send outbound traffic.

Microsoft Windows Servers within the 1.x.x.x/16 allocation which were behind a firewall or VPN and did not have public 3389 access did not send the unknown traffic

Would be very interested if anyone else has seen this behavior before !
Or is this the start of a lovely new Zero Day Vulnerability with Windows RDP, if so I name it "ohDeer-RDP"

A sample of the traffic is as per below, collected from netflow

Source                  Destination         Application         Src
Port       Dst
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51534
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       52699
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       60824
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51669
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       49215
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       62099
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       65429
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       51965
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       50381
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       59379
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       58103
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       59514
TCP
x.x.x.x/16            58.162.67.45       ms-wbt-server  3389       58298
TCP

This occurred around 10:30pm AEST Friday the 13th of January 2012

We had many other Microsoft Windows Servers in other 2.x.x.x/16 IP ranges which were totally unaffected.

Kindest Regards

James Braunegg
W:  1300 769 972  |  M:  0488 997 207 |  D:  (03) 9751 7616
E:   james.braunegg at micron21.com<mailto:james.braunegg at micron21.com>  |
ABN:  12 109 977 666

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This message is intended for the addressee named above. It may contain privileged or confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient of this message you must not use, copy, distribute or disclose it to anyone other than the addressee. If you have received this message in error please return the message to the sender by replying to it and then delete the message from your computer.





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