do not filter your customers

Fri Feb 24 02:00:31 UTC 2012

On Feb 23, 2012, at 1:44 AM, Randy Bush wrote:

> a customer leaked a full table to smellstra, and they had not filtered.
> hence the $subject.

Ahh, this is I think the customer "leak" problem I'm trying to illustrate 
that an RPKI/BGPSEC-enabled world alone (as currently prescribed) 
does NOT protect against.  

If it can happen by accident, it can certainly serve as smoke screen or
enable an actual targeted attack quite nicely by those so compelled.

> and things when further downhill from there, when telstra also did not
> filter what they announced to their peers, and the peers went over
> prefix limits and dropped bgp.

Prefix limits are rather binary and indiscriminate, indeed.

-danny