OT: Traffic Light Control (was Re: First real-world SCADA attack in US)

Thu Nov 24 00:41:33 UTC 2011

On 11/23/11 3:38 PM, Jay Ashworth wrote:

> Yes: but as Don Norman would ask: *where was the failure here*?  You can't
> blame all of it on the field tech, even though he had the Last Clear Chance
> to avoid it, if the rest of the system wasn't designed to help protect him
> (procedures, labeling, packaging, etc...). 

It, as with most cases of Things That go Horribly Wrong (tm) was not *a*
failure but a series of them, none of which by itself would have been
particularly significant.

> I don't suppose that made the news, since there wasn't an actual collision?

Not outside of the Public Works and Risk Management Departments, but it
was pretty big news there.

The incident resulted in a 100% city-wide audit of all controller and
conflict monitor programming by a two-person team as well as the
procedure that every conflict monitor board would have a distinctively
colored label placed on it with the name of the intersection, the date
it was programmed, the name of the person who programmed it, and the
name of the person who inspected the programming.

--
Jay Hennigan - CCIE #7880 - Network Engineering - jay at impulse.net
Impulse Internet Service  -  http://www.impulse.net/
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