The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model

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On Mar 24, 2011, at 6:19 PM, Joakim Aronius wrote:

> Surely the value of stolen certs are higher if the public do not know that they exist.


A wider swathe of interested parties would know of their existence, and their existence would be officially confirmed, which would make them more valuable.

Unfortunately, the general public neither know, understand, or care about such things.  They happily click 'I Understand the Risks' or whatever the button says in their browsers of choice to accept self-signed certificates all the time.

I don't know enough details of what actually transpired to have an actual opinion on the Comodo situation one way or another; but I can see both sides of the argument.

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Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>

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