A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level 3's IRR Database)

Tue Feb 1 21:33:19 UTC 2011

Le mardi 01 février 2011 à 12:14 -0500, Christopher Morrow a écrit : 
> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert at gmail.com> wrote:
> > Here be dragons,
> <snip>
> > It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
> > Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
> > Bad Idea.
> >
> 
> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
> 
> > architecturally/technologically *impossible* for a entity from country
> > A to via-the-hierarchical-trust-model block a prefix assigned to some
> > entity in country B, that is assigned by B's RIR and in full
> > accordance with the RIR policies and in no breach of any contract.
> 
> countries do not have RIR's, countries have NIR's... regions have RIR's.

In this context, at least, perhaps the NIR should be considered
superfluous or redundant? What is the operational rationale behind the
NIR level? Wouldn't a flatter RIR-LIR structure do just fine?

mh

> 

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