lawful intercept/IOS at BlackHat DC, bypassing and recommendations

Fri Feb 5 02:26:45 UTC 2010

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:49 PM, Steven Bellovin <smb at cs.columbia.edu> wrote:
>
> On Feb 4, 2010, at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <Crist.Clark at globalstar.com> wrote:
>>
>>>> this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said:
>>> "Just
>>>> send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the
>>>> LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them"
>>>
>>> The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized
>>> access to communications via LI rather than evading them,
>>>
>>>  "...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third
>>>   parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization."
>>>
>>> Of course, this has already happened,
>>
>> right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from
>> (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)...  and the
>> traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not
>> necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from
>> device -> mediation server.
>>
>>>  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005
>>
>> yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks
>> in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in
>> particular.
>
> There's a difference?  CALEA is just the US goverment profile of the generic international concept of lawful intercept.

hrm, I always equate 'calea' with 'ip intercept', because I
(thankfully) never had to see a phone switch (dms type thingy). You
are, I believe, correct in that CALEA was first 'telephone' intercept
implemented in phone-switch-thingies in ~94?? and was later applied
(may 2007ish?) to IP things as well.

-Chris