[Operational] Internet Police

Suresh Ramasubramanian ops.lists at gmail.com
Thu Dec 9 18:49:36 UTC 2010


Let's put it this way.

1. If you host government agencies, provide connectivity to say a
nuclear power plant or an army base, or a bank or .. .. - you'd
certainly work with your customers to meet their security
requirements.

2. If you are a service provider serving up DSL - why then, there are
some governments (say Australia) that have blacklists of child porn
sites - and I think Interpol came up with something similar too.  And
yes there's CALEA and a few other such things .. not much more that's
new.

Separating rhetoric and military metaphors will help you see this a
lot more clearly.  As will not dismissing the entire idea with
contempt.

As a service provider for anything at all, you'll see your share of attacks.

Whether coordinated by 4chan or by comrade joe chan shouldnt really
matter, except at the level where you work with law enforcement etc to
coordinate a response that goes beyond the technical.  [And ALL
responses to these are not going to restrict themselves to being
solvable by technical means].

--srs

On Fri, Dec 10, 2010 at 12:01 AM, Michael Smith <michael at hmsjr.com> wrote:
> How is "what to block" identified?  ...by content key words?  ..traffic
> profiles / signatures?  Deny all, unless flow (addresses/protocol/port) is
> pre-approved / registered?
>
> What does the technical solution look like?
>
> Any solutions to maintain some semblance of freedom?
>



-- 
Suresh Ramasubramanian (ops.lists at gmail.com)




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