Did your BGP crash today?
Jack Bates
jbates at brightok.net
Mon Aug 30 15:55:03 UTC 2010
Florian Weimer wrote:
> This whole thread is quite schizophrenic because the consensus appears
> to be that (a) a *researcher is not to blame* for sending out a BGP
> message which eventually leads to session resets, and (b) an
> *implementor is to blame* for sending out a BGP messages which
> eventually leads to session resets. You really can't have it both
> ways.
>
As good a place to break in on the thread as any, I guess. Randy and
others believe more testing should have been done. I'm not completely
sure they didn't test against XR. They very likely could have tested in
a 1 on 1 connection and everything looked fine.
I don't know the full details, but at what point did the corruption
appear, and was it visible? We know that it was corrupt on the output
which caused peer resets, but was it necessarily visible in the router
itself?
Do we require a researcher to setup a chain of every vender BGP speaker
in every possible configuration and order to verify a bug doesn't cause
things to break? In this case, one very likely would need an XR
receiving and transmitting updates to detect the failure, so no less
than 3 routers with the XR in the middle.
What about individual configurations? Perhaps the update is received and
altered by one vendor due to specific configurations, sent to the next
vendor, accepted and altered (due to the first alteration, where as it
wouldn't be altered if the original update had been received) which
causes the next vendor to reset. Then we add to this that it may pass
silently through several middle vendor routers without problems and we
realize the scope of such problems and why connecting to the Internet is
so unpredictable.
Jack
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