Cart and Horse
James Pleger
jpleger at gmail.com
Mon Apr 13 16:01:25 UTC 2009
Yes, they could create a solution for this that will cost money, or
they could just take out the welding specs and go to town for a
fraction of the price.
This type of stuff is typical of incident response... Fix the bleeding
and create a long term solution that won't be as big of an impact.
Regards,
James Pleger
e: jpleger at gmail.com
g: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x9D7141C9
On Apr 13, 2009, at 8:49 AM, Church, Charles wrote:
> Wouldn't some authentication system be more useful than trying to lock
> all the manholes? Picture a system maybe using RFID or some other
> radio
> system where you walk up to manhole, wave your 'wand' (like a Mobil
> Speedpass), you hear a couple beeps, and you're cleared to open the
> manhole. Without authenticating, you can still get in, but the NOCs
> at
> local utilities and telcos are notified, maybe police as well. If you
> can tie access to a particular person's ID, I doubt that person will
> misuse it. Of course, this requires power and battery backup. On the
> other hand, maybe it's time to put the blame on the unions. If the
> saboteur is found to be a union member, maybe penalize the entire
> union
> somehow, since they're acting like a terrorist group at that point.
>
> Chuck
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Lamar Owen [mailto:lowen at pari.edu]
> Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 11:22 AM
> To: nanog at nanog.org
> Subject: Re: Cart and Horse
>
>
> On Monday 13 April 2009 11:06:55 Roy wrote:
>> A friend mentioned at dinner yesterday that he spotted several AT&T
>> trucks next to manholes in the area affected by the fiber cut. They
>> were busy welding the manhole covers to their rims.
>
> :-)
>
> Sounds like a cutting torch or portable chop saw will become standard
> service
> equipment for them after all.
>
>
>
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