prefix hijack by ASN 8997

Marshall Eubanks tme at multicasttech.com
Tue Sep 23 10:39:14 CDT 2008


On Sep 23, 2008, at 8:15 AM, Scott Weeks wrote:

>
>
> --- tme at multicasttech.com wrote:
> From: Marshall Eubanks <tme at multicasttech.com>
>
> : You didn't specify the time zone you are in,
> : so I looked at +- 1 day around it. If the
> : hijack lasted 6 hours, we should have seen it.
>
> My apologies, I just used the time zone the tool  
> (bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay) was using when I said:
> 22/9/2008  9:00:00   and   22/9/2008  15:00:00
>
> I'm sure it was in GMT.  Seeing the many responses, we now know  
> something happened and it was only about 15 minutes in duration.

These two times are separated by 6 hours exactly (0500 and 1100 EDT).

There is a positive report at 1330 Moscow time or 0930 UTC  or 0530 EDT.
There is a positive report "a few minutes" before 0122 UTC - say 0115
There is a positive report at 1222091563 which I cannot interpret.  
(1222 UTC ?)

We have my negative reports at 0607 EDT and 1207 EDT, etc., or 1007  
UTC and 1607 UTC, etc.

So (all times UTC)

0407 no
0900 yes
0930 yes
1007 no
1500 yes
1607 no
2207 no
0115 yes
0407 no

So, do you think this was lots of little tests / hijacks / mistakes ?  
Or did it just not propagate very far ?

Marshall

>
> bgplay shows the problem with the above data and I was just  
> wondering if I was understanding the impact correctly:
>
>> If the above two are correct, would it be
>> correct to say only the downstream customers
>> of ASN 3267 were affected?
>
> I was not following the rules properly: never attribute to malice  
> that which can be explained by human error.  I thought there might  
> be some testing-of-the-water in preparation for future 'events' and  
> I guess I was starting to be trigger happy after all the talk about  
> the new BGP attack.
>
> scott
>
>
>
>
> --- tme at multicasttech.com wrote:
>
> From: Marshall Eubanks <tme at multicasttech.com>
> To: surfer at mauigateway.com
> Cc:  <nanog at merit.edu>
> Subject: Re: prefix hijack by ASN 8997
> Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2008 07:51:36 -0400
>
>
> On Sep 22, 2008, at 9:06 PM, Scott Weeks wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> I am hoping to confirm a short-duration prefix hijack of
>> 72.234.0.0/15 (and another of our prefixes) by ASN 8997 ("OJSC North-
>> West Telecom" in Russia) in using ASN 3267 (Russian Federal
>> University Network) to advertise our space to ASN 3277 (Regional
>> University and Scientific Network (RUSNet) of North-Western and
>> Saint-Petersburg Area of Russia).
>>
>> Is that what I'm seeing when I go to "bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay",
>> put in prefix 72.234.0.0/15 and select the dates:
>>
>> 22/9/2008  9:00:00   and   22/9/2008  15:00:00
>>
>> If so, am I understanding it correctly if I say ASN 3267 saw a
>> shorter path from ASN 8997, so refused the proper announcement from
>> ASN 36149 (me) it normally hears from ASN 174 (Cogent).
>
> I cannot confirm that from the monitoring program at AS 16517 :
>
> [tme at lennon mcast]$ grep 72.234.0.0 bgp.full.Sep_2*2008
> bgp.full.Sep_21_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_21_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_21_12:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_21_18:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_22_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_22_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_22_12:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_22_18:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_23_00:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
> bgp.full.Sep_23_06:07:00_EDT_2008:*> 72.234.0.0/15
> 38.101.161.116        3990             0 174 209 36149 ?
>
> You didn't specify the time zone you are in, so I looked at +- 1 day
> around it. If the hijack lasted 6 hours, we
> should have seen it.
>
> Regards
> Marshall
>
>
>>
>>
>> If the above two are correct, would it be correct to say only the
>> downstream customers of ASN 3267 were affected?
>>
>> scott
>>
>
>
>
>





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