Multiple DNS implementations vulnerable to cache poisoning

Steven M. Bellovin smb at cs.columbia.edu
Wed Jul 9 11:11:27 CDT 2008


On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 12:05:38 -0400
"Christopher Morrow" <morrowc.lists at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Jul 9, 2008 at 11:41 AM, Steven M. Bellovin
> <smb at cs.columbia.edu> wrote:
> 
> > The ISC web page on the attack notes "DNSSEC is the only definitive
> > solution for this issue. Understanding that immediate DNSSEC
> > deployment is not a realistic expectation..."  I wonder what NANOG
> > folk can do about the second part of that quote...
> 
> get the root zone signed, get com/net/org/ccTLD's signed.. oh wait,
> that's not nanog... doh!
> 
> Pressure your local ICANN officers?
> 
How many ISPs run DNS servers for customers?  Start by signing those
zones -- that has to be done in any event.  Set up caching resolvers to
verify signatures.  "It is not your part to finish the task, yet you
are not free to desist from it."  (From the Talmud, circa 130.)

No, I didn't say it would be easy, but if we don't start we're not
going to get anywhere.


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb




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