New Laptop Polices

joe mcguckin joe at via.net
Sun Aug 13 22:25:45 UTC 2006


Why not put critical or proprietary files on a flash key? I carry a  
4G flash key on my keyring. Airport security has never given it a second
look. If the laptop ends up in the hands of a sticky-fingered baggage  
handler (or the TSA), there's nothing there for them to find.

And, to defeat the nosey customs folk who now want to login and  
rummage around your files when you enter the US, create a dummy
account and give them that login when they insist on inspecting your  
laptop for "child porn". I've got nothing to hide, but I don't want some
ham handed idiot accidently deleting stuff either...

Joe McGuckin
ViaNet Communications

joe at via.net
650-207-0372 cell
650-213-1302 office
650-969-2124 fax



On Aug 12, 2006, at 7:44 AM, Todd Vierling wrote:

>
> On 8/11/06, Christopher L. Morrow
> <christopher.morrow at verizonbusiness.com> wrote:
>> > It's also a great time to plant some file that POOF the authorities
>> > will decrypt & show it's kiddie porn. {Or just hide same in your
>> > browser cache.} Do YOU know what every frigging file on your
>> > machine is?
>>
>> and here I was thinking: "Quick! buy stock in whole disk encryption
>> software makers!"
>
> Any laptop NOT using full disk encryption from the moment of boot-up
> is begging for trouble.  As has been pointed out many times, laptops
> DO get lost, and not just in airline facilities.
>
> This can be accomplished with just about any OS.  Some require loading
> an OS kernel first with a custom ramdisk or mini-partition to kick off
> the encrypted disk driver; others can use off the shelf products
> designed expressly for this purpose.
>
> The only thing that bugs most people about full disk encryption is
> that it often doesn't support "hibernation" -- but if the hardware has
> a standby power save mode that is low enough on power consumption (S3
> or similar), that shouldn't be a problem.
>
> -- 
> -- Todd Vierling <tv at duh.org> <tv at pobox.com> <todd at vierling.name>

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