LSR and packet filters
Bill Manning
bmanning at ISI.EDU
Mon Sep 15 02:31:20 UTC 1997
> > >> a packet transmitted between two nonfaulty end systems A
> > >> and B will have a high probability of being delivered,
> > >> provided that at least one path consists of nonfaulty
> > >> components connects the two end systems. [...] The
> > >> network layer makes no attempt to keep conversations
> > >> private. If privacy is necessary, encryption must be
> > >> done at a higher layer. Also, the network layer need not
> > >> certify data that it delivers. For instance, it is
> > >> possible for some malicious node C to generate data, get
> > >> it delivered to B, and claim that the data was from A.
> > >> It is up to the higher layer in B to differentiate
> > >> between corrupted or counterfeit data and real data,
> > >> using known cryptographic techniques".
> > >
> > >Well, then he is *WRONG*. Authentication and privacy should be a function
> > >of the network layer, not the application layer because it is a lot easier
> > >to attack application layer encryption compared to lower layers.
> >
> > Radia is a she. Anyone who has been in this field for more than 2 years
> > should know that even if you can't guess what tli or pst or Yakov are :-)
>
> Quoting Marcus Ranum: "I do not care who or what that is as long as it
> makes sense".
>
> Alex
Oh, Radia makes sense. Its just that your assumptions and hers
differ.
--
--bill
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